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ABSTRACT 
Downstream Merger with Oligopolistic Input Suppliers 
by Kjell Erik Lommerud, Odd Rune Straume, Lars Sørgard* 
We examine how a downstream merger affects input prices and, in turn, the profitability 
of such a merger under Cournot competition with differentiated products. Input 
suppliers can be interpreted as ordinary upstream firms, or trade unions organising 
workers. If the input suppliers are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more 
profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous input prices. In contrast to the 
received literature, we find that it can be more profitable to take part in a merger than 
being an outsider. For firm-specific input suppliers, on the other hand, results are 
reversed. We apply our model to endogenous merger formation in an international 
oligopoly, and show that the equilibrium market structure is likely to be characterised 
by cross-border merger. 
 
Keywords: merger profitability, input suppliers, trade unions, cross-border merger 
JEL classification: J51, L13, L41 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Nachgelagerte Fusionen mit oligopolistischen Inputanbietern 
Wir untersuchen, inwiefern nachgelagerte Fusionen Inputpreise erhöhen und wie diese 
wiederum die Fusionen bei Cournot-Wettbewerb mit unterschiedlichen Produkten 
beeinflussen. Inputanbieter können als normale vorgelagerte Firmen oder als Gewerk-
schaften, die Arbeiter organisieren interpretiert werden. Wenn die Inputanbieter werks-
spezifisch sind, finden wir, daß eine Fusion profitabler ist, als in einem vergleichbaren 
Modell mit exogenen Inputpreisen. Im Gegensatz zur herkömmlichen Literatur finden 
wir, daß es profitabler sein kann an einer Fusion teilzunehmen, denn ein Außen-
stehender zu sein. Für firmenspezifische Inputanbieter andererseits, ist das Ergebnis 
umgekehrt. Wir wenden unser Modell auf endogene Fusionsformierung in einem inter-
nationalen Oligopol an und zeigen, daß die Gleichgewichtsmarktstruktur wahrscheinlich 
durch grenzüberschreitende Fusionen gekennzeichnet ist. 
                                                 
*  We are indebted to Lars Mathiesen, two anonymous referees, seminar participants at the CEPR/IUI 
Workshop on Mergers and Competition in Stockholm, the Third Norwegian Workshop on Labor 
Markets and Education in Stavern, the Free University of Berlin and the EARIE conference in 
Lausanne for valuable comments on an earlier draft. We thank the Norwegian Research Council and 
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1 Introduction
It is often claimed that downstream mergers aﬀect not only output
prices, but also input prices. For example, empirical literature sug-
gests that mergers may aﬀect wages, one of the most important inputs
to production (see e.g. Peoples et al., 1993, and McGuckin et al., 1995).
Despite this evidence, the theoretical literature on mergers does not in-
vestigate any possible links between mergers and wages or input prices
more in general.1 It is mainly concerned with how a merger aﬀects the
rivalry between firms in the downstream market. The purpose of this
paper is to help filling this gap by analysing mergers in a setting with
oligopolistic input suppliers.
It is not clear-cut how a downstream merger aﬀects the input sup-
plier structure. In some instances it may lead to a merger between the
merging firms’ input suppliers as well. For example, the two merging
downstream firms’ trade unions may merge into one trade union after
the merger. We characterise this as firm-specific input suppliers. In
other instances the input suppliers are plant-specific and thereby do not
merge as a response to the downstream merger. This could be the case if
the upstream firms are traditional input suppliers of other factors than
labour, or if the downstream merger is a cross-border merger and each
trade union continues as a trade union for a plant in each country. We
show that the input supply structure - whether input suppliers are plant-
or firm-specific - is decisive for the input price responses, and thus the
profitability, of a downstream merger.
In a seminal paper, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) show that
in a Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous goods, linear demand and
constant marginal costs, a merger is unprofitable unless the merging
coalition consists of more than 80 per cent of all firms in the indus-
try. More recent studies have shown how a relaxation of some of the
1There are a few notable exceptions. González-Maestre and López-Cuñat (2001)
analyse merger in a homogeneous Cournot model where each owner delegates output
decisions to a manager. The manager’s incentive scheme, which is endogenous in the
model and thereby aﬀected by a merger, can be regarded as an input price. Since
the incentive scheme is set by the owner, their setting is distinctly diﬀerent from ours
where we have independent input suppliers that set input prices. In Bárcena-Ruiz
and Garzón (2000) a merger aﬀects wage setting. However, they analyse a merger
from duopoly to monopoly. Horn and Wolinsky (1988a) apply a bargaining model to
analyse a merger from duopoly to monopoly, either upstream (unions) or downstream
(firms) merger. Our approach is diﬀerent in several ways, though. Horn andWolinsky
consider downstream merger only in the case of a single upstream input supplier. For
our purposes, this turns out to be the least interesting case. Furthermore, since we
are concerned about the well known free rider problem in the merger literature, we
apply a model which includes a non-merging firm.
2
assumptions in Salant et al. (1983) may restore the perhaps more in-
tuitive result that mergers are most often profitable. Predictions from
theory are that a merger without any cost savings is typically profitable
under Bertrand competition, and typically unprofitable under Cournot
competition unless products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated.2
More clear-cut is the theory’s prediction concerning the insiders’ ver-
sus the outsiders’ gain from a merger. As far as we know, no studies
find that it is more profitable to be one of the merging firms than to
be one of the non-merging firms unless there are some exogenous cost
savings following a merger.3 One could then argue that each firm should
wait, hoping that other firms merge and then be a free rider on such a
merger.4
Our model is in much the same spirit as Salant et al. (1983). We
apply a Cournot model of diﬀerentiated products.5 The results in the
literature are reproduced in a benchmark version of our model, where
the firms’ input prices - which can be wages or prices on other input
factors - are exogenous.
In the model, there is only one input to production and it is supplied
by an independent input supplier.6 As is common in models of vertical
relations, we assume that the upstream input suppliers set prices prior to
the Cournot subgame in the downstream market. If the input supplier
is an ordinary firm, it maximises profits. However, the input supplier
might instead be a trade union that is concerned about both wages and
employment. Profit maximisation by a firm would be analogous to rent
maximisation by a trade union, one particular kind of trade-oﬀ between
wages and employment. We choose a maximisation problem for the input
supplier that includes a parameter capturing the trade-oﬀ between wages
2Concerning product diﬀerentiation, see Deneckere and Davidson (1985) and Lom-
merud and Sørgard (1997); concerning the cost side, see Perry and Porter (1985) and
McAfee and Williams (1992); concerning the nature of competition, see Deneckere
and Davidson (1985).
3A referee has drawn our attention to Creane and Davidson (2000). In this paper,
a merged firm retains the original firms as divisions with some autonomy. The
headquarter can stage a Stackelberg quantity setting game among the divisions, and
this can lead to profitable mergers with insiders benefitting more than outsiders. A
quite parallel research eﬀort is Huck, Konrad and Müller (2001).
4This free rider problem was first pointed out in Stigler (1950). Fridolfsson and
Stennek (2000) show that this mechanism may delay a merger rather than prevent
it completely.
5It can be shown that our results are valid also for the case of Bertrand competition
and diﬀerentiated products, see Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard (2000).
6In Farrell and Shapiro (1990a, 1990b) and Perry and Porter (1985) there are also
cost eﬀects of a merger. While in our model the cost eﬀect is due to changes in input
prices, the cost eﬀects in their models are due to internal costs savings.
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and employment, which implies that a profit maximising input supplier
can be treated as a special case.7 It should be noted that the case of
a trade union that emphasise employment considerations, is parallel to
the case of a non-profit-maximising firm that puts much weight on sales.
We distinguish between three diﬀerent ways to organise the supply
of input: the input suppliers can either be plant-specific, firm-specific or
industry-specific. In the latter case all the input suppliers in the industry
are organised in a single firm, which in the case of trade unions can be
interpreted as one trade union for the entire industry. The single input
supplier is then not only a monopolist in the input market, but a back-
seat monopolist in the product market as well. A merger is irrelevant
for upstream price setting in such a context, because what matters is
the elasticity of product market demand, which is not aﬀected by a
downstream merger. The results from the standard literature still apply.
Our main focus is on the case of plant-specific input suppliers, which
dramatically changes the results from the benchmark model. A plant-
specific input supplier delivers its input to one plant only. In this case a
merger between two firms does not change the number of input suppliers,
but it changes the rivalry between them. The two merged firms’ input
suppliers compete more fiercely on input prices to serve the merged firm.
We find that, in contrast to the standard literature, a merger is now
profitable. The exception is the case where the input supplier is a trade
union with strong preferences for employment. A highly employment-
oriented union would imply that wages are close to the competitive level
initially, so that a merger has only a limited eﬀect on wages.
We show that the merging firm’s input prices are always lower than
the non-merging firms’ input prices. Due to this a merger can be more
profitable for a merging than for a non-merging firm. The exception
is, again, the case where the input suppliers are trade unions with a
suﬃciently strong emphasis on employment. In such a case the merger
has only limited eﬀects on wages, and the traditional result about merger
in Cournot oligopoly applies.
If the input suppliers are firm- rather than plant-specific, our re-
sults are reversed. In the case of firm-specific input suppliers, a merger
between two firms implies that the merging firms’ input suppliers also
merge. One natural interpretation would be that the input suppliers are
trade unions within a country, and the trade unions merge when the
firms merge so there is only one trade union per firm. We then have a
7By letting the input supplier set prices, we have de facto applied a monopoly
union model in the cases where the input suppliers are trade unions. It can be shown
that our results are valid also in a setting with an eﬃcient bargaining model rather
than a monopoly union, see Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard (2000).
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higher concentration in the input market, which reduces the rivalry be-
tween the input suppliers. In this case a merger results in higher input
prices, and more so for the merging firms than for the non-merging firm.
Not surprisingly then, a merger is now less profitable than in the case
with exogenous input prices. In this case a merger is unprofitable under
Cournot competition unless the products are highly diﬀerentiated and
the input suppliers are trade unions with an extremely strong emphasis
on employment. Since input prices increase more for the merging than
the non-merging firms, an outsider earns more from a merger than a
participant. Thus, the traditional result in the literature is restored in
this respect.
We also apply our model to endogenous merger formation. A firm can
merge with either another domestic firm or a foreign firm. Given that the
input suppliers are trade unions, we argue that a domestic downstream
merger may lead to union merger as well, whereas a merger between
a domestic and a foreign firm would not lead to such a union merger.
By applying the approach introduced in Horn and Persson (2001) we
show that, for a large set of parameter values, the equilibrium market
structure is cross-border merger. The reason is that such a merger would
reduce rents among the input suppliers, while a domestic merger would
have the opposite eﬀect.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we present the
model, with a benchmark for comparison. In Section 3 we investigate
downstream merger with plant-specific input suppliers, while we in Sec-
tion 4 analyse how our results change if we have either firm-specific or
industry specific input suppliers. In Section 5 we apply the model to en-
dogenous merger formation, and in Section 6 we discuss some extension
of our model. We oﬀer some concluding remarks in Section 7.
2 Some preliminaries
Consider an oligopoly industry that consists of three firms, each produc-
ing one brand of a diﬀerentiated product. Let firm i produce brand i
in quantity qi. There is no entry or threat of entry, and firms compete
in a Cournot fashion. For the moment we assume that firms 1 and 2
are the merger candidates. Later on, we allow for endogenous merger
formation. We assume that the merged firm continues to produce two
brands (1 and 2), making it ’larger’ than either of the pre-merger firms.
The outsider (firm 3) continues to produce one brand (3). Let us here
first show the results found in a benchmark model with exogenous input
prices, and then introduce endogenous input prices.
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A benchmark
Demand for the diﬀerentiated product is characterised by a symmet-
ric demand system, where the inverse demand function for brand 1 is
given by
p1 = 1− q1 − b (q2 + q3) (1)
with a corresponding structure for the inverse demand functions for the
other brands. The parameter b ∈ h0, 1i is a measure of substitutability
in demand. If b → 0 the brands are regarded as (almost) unrelated,
whereas b→ 1 corresponds to the case of (almost) homogeneous goods.
There is only one factor of production, and one unit of input is sup-
plied to the downstream firm at a price w. We assume that the input
supply from diﬀerent input suppliers is homogeneous and that diﬀerent
brands are produced by using the same production technology, so that
the only factors that ties a certain brand to a firm are patent rights or
sunk marketing investments.
We adopt a very simple linear production function, given by
qi = li (2)
where qi is total quantity produced (of brand i) by firm i, and li is the
total amount of input employed by firm i. In this case, output and input
are equivalent.
As a benchmark for later comparison, consider the following result:
Lemma 1. If input prices are exogenous and equal across firms, a
downstream merger is profitable if b < 0.55, and more profitable for the
outsider than for a participant.
Proof. Results follow directly from Lommerud and Sørgard (1997).
¥
An outsider’s best response to a reduction in sales by the merging
firm is to increase its sales, thereby reducing the profitability of a merger.
As shown in Salant et al. (1983), for the case of homogeneous products,
the eﬀect of the outsiders’ response may dominate so that a merger is
unprofitable. However, each outsider’s response is dampened if products
are diﬀerentiated. This explains why merger can be profitable under
Cournot competition if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated.8
8Note that the benchmark for our analysis is not a Salant et al. (1983) type
of model, where merger only leads to one firm disappearing, but a Lommerud and
Sørgard (1997) type of model where a merged firm is ’larger’ than other firms because
it now controls two brands. There is a close parallel to Baye, Crocker and Ju (1996).
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Irrespective of the nature of competition, the outsider will be a free
rider on the merger. It will experience higher prices and higher sales. It
will therefore gain more from the merger than the insiders, who experi-
ence a reduction in sales.
The upstream market
We model the upstream market in such a way that input suppliers
can be interpreted as either traditional profit maximising firms, or as
trade unions that maximise union welfare. The most convenient way
is to model the input supplier as a trade union, and then treat the
profit maximising firm as a special version of the utility maximising
trade union. For the moment then, let us consider the trade union. We
assume that wages are unilaterally set by monopoly unions.9 They are
characterised by identical Stone-Geary utility functions, given by
Ui = (wi − w)θ (li)1−θ (3)
where the parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] captures the relative importance of wages
and employment to the unions.10 The reservation wage, w, is equal to
the wage that could be earned in the competitive sector of the economy.
For simplicity, w will be set equal to zero.
Now it is easily seen that, with w = 0, a profit maximising input
supplier would be analogous to a union that maximises rents. Further,
setting θ = 1/2, we have a maximisation problem that is equivalent
to the one facing profit maximizing upstream firms that are allowed to
set the prices of the input they deliver to downstream firms. When
θ → 0, this means that the upstream input suppliers only cares about
sales/employment. This approximates the situation one would get when
the input supplier is a price taker at a competitively given price.
The input supply structure is assumed to be exogenously given. From
Horn and Wolinsky (1988b) we know that if we allow the input supply
structure to be endogenously determined, the input suppliers will have
an incentive to form a single encompassing input supplier, as long as
products are substitutes in the output market. However, the observation
of great variation in input supply structure across diﬀerent countries -
for example trade union structure - indicates the importance of various
institutional determinants of the organisation of input suppliers.
In this model keeping a divisionalised structure, for example after a merger, plays
much the same role as keeping ’brands’ in our previous model.
9As pointed out by Dowrick (1989), this can be viewed as a limiting case of the
wage-bargaining union, where the union has all the bargaining strength.
10θ can be viewed as a measure of labour market distortion caused by unions.
When θ → 0 the wage approaches the competitive level. θ is assumed to be equal for
all unions.
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In the present model we attempt to explore input price responses of
downstreammergers, and the incentives for such mergers, under diﬀerent
exogenous input supply structures. Our main focus is directed towards
the case which we find most interesting, namely that of plant-specific in-
put supply, in which input suppliers are unable to coordinate their prices
across diﬀerent plants. This structure might be the natural one when
the input suppliers are upstream, profit maximising firms, since there
are no institutional mechanisms implying that a downstream merger
should trigger a merger between input suppliers. In addition, in mar-
kets where firms are located in diﬀerent countries, there are obviously
both geographical and cultural obstacles to input supply cooperation. In
particular, whereas international mergers is a highly prevalent phenom-
enon among firms, we hardly ever observe a formal cooperation between
trade unions across borders.11 One main reason is probably that capital
is highly mobile between countries, whereas labour is generally not.
With domestic mergers, though, a natural modelling approach might
in some cases be to assume firm-specific input suppliers. For example,
trade unions are typically organised within a firm.12 A downstream
merger would then naturally lead to union merger as well. Moreover, it
turns out that the merged firms’ input suppliers are worse oﬀ following a
downstream merger. It is then natural also to investigate the case where
a downstream merger triggers an upstream merger, which is captured in
the model with firm-specific input suppliers.
Since a merger is a long term commitment, it is natural for the merger
candidates to anticipate the input suppliers’ response to a downstream
merger. In accordance with this, we let the merger decision be the stage
1 decision. Moreover, we would expect the input suppliers to antici-
pate how their price setting aﬀects the price setting in the downstream
market. Then we have the following sequence of moves:
Stage 1: Firm 1 and 2 decide whether or not to merge.
Stage 2: The input suppliers set input prices.
Stage 3: The downstream firms set quantities.
11In 1999, the share of all mergers and aquisitions, in terms of value, that was
cross-border reached nearly 31 per cent (UNCTAD, 2000).
12Unions are not firm-specific in all countries. In countries with very decentralised
bargaining structures, as the US and the UK (to the extent that these still are
unionised countries), this might perhaps best be represented as plant-specific union-
ism, especially when there is a substantial product diﬀerentiation among the divisions
in a merged entity. The recent strike at Boeing, following the merger with McDonnell
Douglas, can perhaps best be interpreted as a plant-specific union struggling, after a
merger, to avoid cut-backs in employment at precisely their own plant.
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3 Plant-specific input suppliers
With plant-specific input suppliers input prices are determined at plant
level. The decision of whether or not to merge, is assumed to be based
on a payoﬀ comparison with the no-merger benchmark equilibrium. In
the no-merger game, firm i chooses li to maximise
πi = (pi − wi) li (4)
where wi is the input price set by firm i’s input supplier, which maximises
Ui = (wi)
θ (li)
1−θ (5)
In the post-merger game, the merged firm chooses l1 and l2 to maximise
πm = (p1 − w1) l1 + (p2 − w2) l2 (6)
where w1 is the input price set by the input supplier at plant 1, and w2 is
the input price set by the input supplier at plant 2. These input suppliers
set their input prices simultaneously by maximising, respectively,
U1 = (w1)
θ (l1)
1−θ (7)
and
U2 = (w2)
θ (l2)
1−θ (8)
Regarding the input price response to a merger, we have the following
result:13
Lemma 2. (i) w3 > wi if θ < 12 or b is suﬃciently low.
(ii) wi > w1 = w2.
(iii) w3 > w1 = w2.
The merging firms’ input prices fall, while the input price set by
the outsider’s input supplier will increase or decrease, depending on the
degree of product diﬀerentiation, and union preferences in the case of
trade unions. Importantly, though, the merged firm always faces lower
input prices than the outsider.
The input suppliers’ price setting on input is governed by the trade-
oﬀ between input prices and sales. Thus, a downstream merger will
lead to a change in input prices only if the nature of this trade-oﬀ is
changed as a result of the merger. Providing that there are at least two
13All remaining proofs are presented in the appendix. Regarding notation, sub-
script i refers to the symmetric no-merger outcome, whereas all other subscripts refer
to the post-merger outcome.
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upstream firms in the industry, a downstream merger will change the
price elasticities of market shares for the input suppliers. The larger is
the share of total industry sales an input supplier will lose by increasing
the input price (i.e. the higher is the market share elasticity), the less
favourable is the trade-oﬀ between higher input prices and lower sales.
Consequently, the smaller is the incentive for the input supplier to push
for a higher input price.
The market share elasticities will change as a result of changes in the
rivalry (1) between downstream firms and (2) between upstream input
suppliers.
(1) Reduced product market competition
Consider a situation in which firm 1 and 2 buy their inputs from a
single input supplier, whereas a second input supplier is setting the input
price for sales to firm 3. Analysing a merger between firm 1 and 2 in
this situation would be one way to isolate the eﬀect of reduced product
market competition on the price setting on inputs.14
Comparing pre- and post-merger input prices for the merger partic-
ipants in this case, we find that
∆w = θ
2b3 (1− θ) (2 + θb)
2
¡
2 + b− θ2b2
¢ ¡
2 + 2b− θ2b2
¢ > 0 (9)
Hence, a reduction of product market competition leads to an increase
in input prices. This is in line with findings in related union-oligopoly
models, where input prices are wages (see e.g. Dowrick, 1989). Re-
duced product market competition means that the input suppliers’ mar-
ket shares get less elastic. In other words, the less competitive is the
product market, the smaller is the reduction in an input supplier’s share
of total industry sales resulting from a marginal increase in the price
level on inputs. Thus, a more concentrated downstream industry means
that the trade-oﬀ between higher input prices and lower sales is more
favourable for the input supplier, and the input supplier will optimally
set a higher input price. In addition, this eﬀect is reinforced by the
strategic complementarity of input prices.
The magnitude of the increase in input prices due to reduced prod-
uct market competition is highly dependent on the degree of product
diﬀerentiation. From (9) it is easily found that
∂ (∆w)
∂b > 0
14Reduced product market competition aﬀects price setting on inputs only to the
extent that it aﬀects market share elasticities for the input suppliers. Thus, there
must be some degree of competition between input suppliers for this eﬀect to be
present (cf. the case of industry-specific input suppliers in Section 4.2).
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Thus, a higher degree of substitutability in demand implies that the in-
crease in input prices from a reduction in product market competition
is larger. This is quite intuitive. If products are almost unrelated, mar-
ket shares are hardly aﬀected by the price setting on inputs and thus
play a very limited role for the optimal behaviour of input suppliers. As
products become closer substitutes, though, market shares become in-
creasingly sensitive to input price diﬀerentials, and changes in the degree
of product market competition have a greater influence on input price
setting.
(2) Increased competition between input suppliers
For the input suppliers of the merger participants, changes in market
share elasticities due to the merger is mainly caused by what we could
term a second-sourcing eﬀect. That is, when the merged firm is costlessly
able to shift production between its two plants the market shares of
the input suppliers belonging to the merged firm are highly dependent
on within-firm input price diﬀerentials, making the market shares more
elastic. This pulls in the direction of lower input prices. This eﬀect is
reinforced by the rivalry between the merged firm’s input suppliers.
One way to isolate the second-sourcing eﬀect is to fix the input prices
of firm 2 and 3 at the pre-merger level (see (A.1) in the appendix) when
calculating the post-merger equilibrium. In this case input supplier 1
will set the input price15
w1 |w2,w3 fixed=
θ (2 + θb− 2b)
2 + b− 2θb (10)
Comparing (10) and (A.1) we find that the change in input prices due
to the second-sourcing eﬀect is given by
∆w1 =
−θb (1− θ)
(2 + b− 2θb) < 0
Furthermore, we also see that ∂(∆w1)
∂b
< 0. Second-sourcing, created by
the merger, implies that the market shares of the merged firm’s input
suppliers become more elastic, causing the input suppliers to reduce
input prices. Since the relative market shares become more sensitive to
within-firm input price diﬀerentials when products are closer substitutes,
this eﬀect is increasing in b. In addition, this eﬀect is reinforced by the
competition between the input suppliers within the merged firm. This
15For suﬃciently high values of b we have a corner solution with all production
taking place at plant 1, but this is not important for the argument.
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eﬀect can be introduced by letting also w2 be determined endogenously
post-merger. In this case we find that
w1 |w3 fixed=
2θ (4 + 3θb2 + b3 − θb3 − 2θb− b2 − 4b)
(2 + b− 2θb) (4 + θb2 − b2 − 4θb) (11)
Comparing (10) and (11) we find that
∆w1 =
−θ2b2 (4− b) (1− θ)
(2 + b− 2θb) (4 + θb2 − b2 − 4θb) < 0
Since input prices are strategic complements, rivalry between the input
suppliers causes input prices to drop further. The strength of this eﬀect
is highly sensitive to the degree of product diﬀerentiation. From (11) we
see that w1, w2 → 0 when b → 1. In the extreme case, when products
are homogeneous, input prices in the merged firm are competed down
to the reservation level.
For the outside firm, Lemma 2 shows that the merger has an ambigu-
ous eﬀect on input prices. This is due to two opposing forces governing
the outside input supplier’s price setting. On one hand, product market
competition is reduced, which points in the direction of higher input
prices, as we have seen above. On the other hand, since input prices are
strategic complements, an input price drop for the merged firm provides
the outside firm’s input supplier with an incentive to reduce input prices.
If products are suﬃciently close substitutes, the input price reduction
for the merged firm is suﬃciently large for the latter eﬀect to dominate,
resulting in lower input prices also for the outside firm (cf. Lemma 2).
Proposition 1. With plant-specific input suppliers, a merger is (i)
always profitable for the participants unless b > 0.55 and θ is close
to zero, and (ii) more profitable for a participant than for the outsider
unless θ is very low.
We see from Proposition 1 that the results in the received literature
- referred to in Lemma 1 - is reproduced when θ approaches zero. As
already noted, in this case an input supplier (trade union) only cares
about sales (employment). Therefore a price (wage) close to the reser-
vation price (wage) results both before and after the merger. We are in
fact close to what the situation would have been with an input supplier
(trade union) without market power. In this case, a merger (in the limit)
has no eﬀect on input prices, and it is profitable only if the products are
suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (b < 0.55).
For the profit maximising input suppliers that set input prices - the
case of θ = 1/2 - we see from the Proposition that a merger is always
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Figure 1: Merger profitability with plant-specific input suppliers
profitable for the merging firms and it is always more beneficial to be an
insider than an outsider. Obviously, the driving force is the input price
changes reported in Lemma 1. The merging firm will face lower input
prices, and the merging firm’s input price is lower than the corresponding
input price for the outside firm.
If the input suppliers are trade unions, we see from the Proposition
that it matters whether they are employment-oriented or not. If an
input supplying firm is not a profit maximiser, it matters correspondingly
how it weighs a higher price against lower sales. Here, we concentrate
on the trade union example. We find the existence of a hump-shaped
relationship between θ and post-merger wage responses.16 This, in turn,
determines a similar relationship between θ and merger profitability.
For low levels of θ, pre-merger input prices are close to the competitive
level, and there is not much room for wage reductions. As θ increases,
though, the larger is the wage reduction following a merger, increasing
the profitability for the merger participants. However, for very high
values of θ, the unions have a strong preference for high wages, and even
though there are considerable room for wage reductions, a merger will
only trigger small adjustments in wages. Nevertheless, for values of θ
close to 1, even a marginal reduction in post-merger wages will make a
merger profitable for the participants.
Product diﬀerentiation triggers two opposing forces in our model,
and the strength of these forces are determined by the degree of dif-
ferentiation. On the one hand, a lower degree of product diﬀerentiation
16This is quite natural. A change in wages takes place if a merger changes the
trade-oﬀ between wages and employment. This trade-oﬀ is of importance when both
wages and employment matter for the trade unions, which is especially the case
for medium values of θ. Equilibrium input prices and profits are provided in the
appendix.
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Figure 2: Insider versus outsider profitability of a merger when input
suppliers are plant-specific
makes the outsider’s aggressive response stronger, which tends to make a
merger less profitable (cf. Lemma 1). On the other hand, if products are
close substitutes, the degree of competition between input suppliers is
fierce, making a merger highly eﬀective as a disciplinary device towards
the input suppliers. From Proposition 1 it is apparent that these two
eﬀects tend towards cancelling each other out, making a merger prof-
itable for every degree of product diﬀerentiation, the exception being
when the input suppliers are trade unions with a very strong emphasis
on employment. As shown in Figure 1, a merger is profitable even if
products are (almost) identical as long as θ is above a certain treshold
level.
From Lemma 2 we know that the input price reduction following
a merger is always larger in the merged firm than in the non-merged
firm. This helps explain the result illustrated in Figure 2. A merging
firm gains more from a merger than what is the case for the non-merged
firm. This is always true for the profit maximising input supplier, and
true for the case of trade unions as long as the unions are suﬃciently
wage-oriented. Furthermore, from Figure 2 we also see that if θ and b
are suﬃciently high, a downstreammerger will actually harm the outside
firm, in terms of profits.
4 Other types of input supply structures
As shown in the previous section, a downstream merger may lead to a re-
duction in upstream rents when input suppliers are plant-specific. This
illustrates that after a downstream merger the input suppliers would
have extra incentives to coordinate their input prices in order to reduce
the rivalry between them. One way to do so is for the merging down-
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stream firms’ input suppliers to merge.17 If so, the input suppliers are
firm- rather than plant-specific. In this section we contrast the outcome
derived in the previous section for plant-specific input suppliers with the
case with firm-specific input suppliers. In addition, we briefly describe
the case with a single input supplier for the entire industry.
4.1 Firm-specific input suppliers
If input suppliers are organised at firm level, a merger between two or
more firms will implicitly lead to a higher degree of centralisation in input
price setting, since the merged firm only confronts one input supplier in
the post-merger game. In the second stage of the post-merger game, the
merged firm chooses l1 and l2 to maximise
πm = (p1 − wm) l1 + (p2 − wm) l2 (12)
where wm is the input price set by the merged firm’s input supplier,
which maximises
Um = (wm)
θ (l1 + l2)
1−θ (13)
Lemma 3. wm > w3 > wi.
After the merger, equilibrium input prices increase for both the in-
siders and the outsider, but the merged firm faces a higher input price
than the outsider. Comparing with Lemma 2, the results are reversed
when we go from plant-specific to firm-specific input suppliers.
The results in Lemma 3 follow straightforwardly from our discussion
of input price responses with plant-specific input suppliers. We noted
that a downstream merger aﬀects the rivalry both in the product market
and in the input supply market, and that in the case of plant-specific
input suppliers the two eﬀects work in opposite directions. In this case,
though, the two eﬀects pull in the same direction. A downstream merger
leads to less rivalry both in the product market and in the upstream
market, and both eﬀects tend to increase input prices.
After the merger, there is an asymmetry between the firms. The
merging firm oﬀers two brands while the non-merging firm oﬀers one
brand. For a uniform input price in the industry, this would imply that
the input price/sales ratio is lower for the merged firm’s input supplier.
It will then be optimal for the merged firm’s input supplier to set a price
in excess of the input price facing the outside firm. Consequently, the
17Collusion is another way this can be achieved, but this is not further pursued in
the present paper. For such an analysis within the context of a unionised international
duopoly, see Straume (2002).
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Figure 3: Merger profitability with firm-specific input suppliers
input price increase due to the merger is larger for the merged firm than
for the non-merged firm.
Implications for merger profitability are stated in the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 2. With firm-specific input suppliers, a merger is (i)
profitable for the participants only if b < 0.55 and θ is close to zero, and
(ii) more profitable for the outsider than for a participant.
In Figure 3 we have shown the set of parameter values for which
the merger is profitable for the participants. We see that except for
a few combinations of low θ and low b, a merger is unprofitable. It
suggests that if the input suppliers are profit maximising firms, a merger
is never profitable in the presence of firm-specific input suppliers. If the
input suppliers are trade unions, we have to impose extremely strong
assumptions regarding union preferences for a merger to be profitable.
This is no surprise, given that a merger triggers a wage increase for
the merged firm and this wage increase is larger than the one in the
non-merged firm.
Comparing with Figure 1, we see the importance of the input supply
structure. While it is very likely that a merger is profitable with plant-
specific input suppliers, it is highly unlikely that a corresponding merger
in an industry with firm-specific input suppliers is profitable.
Note also from part (ii) of Proposition 2 that in this case it is better
being the outsider than being a participant in the merger. This is in
contrast to our results with plant-specific input suppliers. However, it
is in line with the results in the received literature. Since we know that
a merger with exogenous input prices is more profitable for an outsider
than for an insider, it is obvious that this conclusion still holds when a
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merger results in a higher input price increase for the merged firm than
for the non-merged firm.
4.2 An industry-specific input supplier
If there are no obstacles to cooperation between the input suppliers, it
is obvious that the input suppliers could gain by coordinated behaviour.
If input suppliers are profit maximising firms, anti-trust policy would
in many countries prevent the input suppliers from establishing a cartel
or to merge to a monopoly. If the input suppliers are trade unions, on
the other hand, there are in many countries no constraints on the coop-
eration between diﬀerent trade unions. If all the firms in the industry
recruit workers from an integrated labour market with a high degree of
worker mobility, we would reasonably expect the workers to be organised
in a single encompassing union (cf. Horn and Wolinsky, 1988b).
It is easily shown that, in this model, an industry-specific input sup-
plier will set the input price
w = θ (14)
regardless of the number of firms in the industry. Thus, a merger would
not aﬀect input prices at all. In Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard (2000)
we show that this result also holds for Bertrand competition.18
A central monopoly input supplier can drive an oligopoly from the
back-seat, so-to-speak. It controls the strategic interaction among firms
by having the ability to fix the marginal production costs of all the
participants. By increasing input prices, product prices will have to
increase and sales will fall. A merger is irrelevant for input price setting
in this context, since it does not aﬀect the elasticity of labour demand.
5 An application: Domestic versus international
merger
A corollary of our model is that international mergers can be more prof-
itable than domestic mergers. This prediction can be explored in greater
detail by looking at a more specific set-up. Assume that, pre-merger,
firm 1 and 2 are located in a ’domestic’ country, whereas firm 3 is located
in a ’foreign’ country. To make things simple, we abstract from trade
18In fact, this result is more general, and does not hinge on the assumption of
linear demand. Under the assumption of constant elasticity of demand, Dowrick
(1989) shows that if the union is organised on an industry-wide basis, the wage is
independent of the degree of product market competitiveness, while Riley (1995)
shows that this result holds for a general demand function, i.e., the elasticity of
industry labour demand is independent of the degree of product market competition.
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costs and assume that the firms compete in a single market.19
In our setting, the diﬀerence between a domestic and an interna-
tional merger can be found in the changes it causes on the input supply
structure. Let us now interpret input suppliers as trade unions. In line
with our previous discussion we assume that a cross-border downstream
merger does not lead to a merger between the trade unions of the merg-
ing firms, whereas, in the case of a domestic downstream merger, this
will indeed be the case.
In order to make predictions about merger formation in this partic-
ular variant of our model, we will make use of an approach developed
by Horn and Persson (2001), which treats the merger process as a coop-
erative game of coalition-formation, where the players are free to com-
municate and write binding contracts. Using the terminology of Horn
and Persson, we let an ownership structure Mi be a partition of the set
N = {1, 2, 3} of owners (firms) into coalitions. Excluding the possibility
of complete monopolisation, there are three possible categories of market
structures, with a combined total of four diﬀerent ownership structures:
1. The decentralised structure (no merger): Mn = {1, 2, 3}
2. A domestic merger: Md = {(1 + 2) , 3}
3. A cross-border merger: Mc = {(1 + 3) , 2} and M 0c = {1, (2 + 3)}
Without going into details about the theoretical foundations, the
approach involves a comparison of any two possible ownership structures
Mi and Mj, where Mi is said to dominate Mj (Mi dom Mj) if the
combined profits of the decisive group of owners are larger inMi than in
Mj. The decisive group of owners are the owners that are expected to
be able to influence whether Mi will be formed instead of Mj, and vice
versa.
Which are the decisive owners? We do not allow payments between
coalition, so owners belonging to identical coalitions in the two struc-
tures cannot aﬀect whether Mj will be formed instead of Mi, but all
remaining owners can influence this choice and are thus decisive. If they
participate in a non-singleton coalition in Mj that does not exist in Mi,
this coalition requires the consent of all members of the coalition to be
formed. Alternatively, if they stand alone in Mj and thus lose partners
by moving from Mi to Mj, they can forgo surplus in Mi in order to
prevent Mj from being formed.20
Finally, the solution concept is the core. Those structures that are
in the core (i.e. the structures that are undominated) are defined as
equilibrium ownership structures. Using this criterion, we are able to
state the following:
19This corresponds to the ’third-market’ model of Brander and Spencer (1985).
20See Horn and Persson (2001) for a formal definition of decisive owners.
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Proposition 3. The equilibrium market structure implies cross-
border merger, unless b > 0.55 and θ is close to zero, for which the
equilibrium market structure implies no merger.
Given the previous results regarding the eﬀects of downstream merg-
ers on input prices, the intuition behind this result is quite intuitive.
In the model of endogenous merger formation that we use, mergers are
conducive to market structures with large industry profits. In our model
such market structures are characterised by cross-border merger, since
this is a more eﬃcient way to reduce rents among the input suppliers.
6 Extensions
Our basic model is rather stylised, so it is natural to check the robustness
of our results. Let us therefore explain how results may change when we
extend our basic model in two diﬀerent directions. For more details, see
Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard (2000).
Bertrand competition. We know from the literature that if Bertrand
competition prevails in a diﬀerentiated products industry, then a merger
with exogenous input prices is always profitable. With plant-specific
input suppliers, we find that this result is reinforced. More interestingly,
we find that - as is the case with Cournot competition and endogenous
input prices - an insider can be better oﬀ than an outsider as a result
of a merger. If the input suppliers are firm-specific, though, a merger
can be unprofitable even in a setting with Bertrand competition. The
driving force is the input price increase following a merger. Hence, our
main results hold also in this extended version of our model. The reason
is that the change in input prices following a merger most of all depends
on the rivalry between the input suppliers, and the nature of this rivalry
- input prices being strategic complements - is independent of the nature
of competition in the product market.
Eﬃcient bargaining. In the basic model we have assumed that the
input suppliers unilaterally set the input price while the downstream
firm has complete discretion over sales decisions. In the case of trade
unions, this is a special case of the right-to-manage model. The union
and the firm bargain over the wage while the firm sets employment. In
the literature this model is often contrasted with the eﬃcient bargain-
ing model, where the union has the same relative bargaining strength
over wage setting as well as employment decisions (and possibly other
relevant decision variables). The existing literature suggests that the
bargaining game that will emerge as the equilibrium outcome depends
on the characteristics of the industry in question.21 It is then natural to
21Bughin (1999) finds that eﬃcient bargaining is the most likely equilibrium out-
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check whether our results still hold if we apply an eﬃcient bargaining
model rather than a monopoly union model. We have only investigated
the case of plant-specific unions. It turns out that the qualitative results
depends on the relative bargaining strength of the players. However, we
find that our main results are still valid. A merger can be profitable
even in a Cournot setting without any exogenous fixed costs savings,
and the insider may earn more from a merger than an outsider. The
intuition is that eﬃcient bargaining introduces two opposing forces. On
the one hand, the unions can extract a share of the potential profit in-
crease following a merger. This tends to make a merger less profitable
in a setting with eﬃcient bargaining. On the other hand, the merged
firm will have a better bargaining position since it can bargain with two
diﬀerent unions.22 The two opposing forces tend towards cancelling each
other out for a large set of parameter values.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that the organisation of input suppliers is
decisive for input price responses to a downstream merger, and hence for
the profitability of such a merger. While plant-specific input suppliers
tend to increase the profitability of a merger and may even make it more
profitable to take part in a merger than being an outsider, the results
are reversed in a setting with firm-specific input suppliers.
Our results suggest that firms considering to merge in an industry
with oligopolistic input suppliers should be concerned about how the
input suppliers respond to a possible merger. The existence of plant-
specific input suppliers is obviously an argument in favour of a merger,
from firms’ point of view. The reason is that a downstreammerger would
trigger an increased degree of competition between the input suppliers
of the merging firms, thereby reducing the rent captured by the input
suppliers. However, the argument in favour of downstreammerger is also
an argument in favour of merger among the input suppliers. By doing
so they can prevent the reduction in their own rent. The plant-specific
input suppliers are then not plant-specific after the merger, but instead
de facto firm-specific input suppliers. The downstream firms should
anticipate such an outcome. We extend our model to an endogenous
merger formation model to take this into account. We show that the
equilibrium market structure might be cross-border merger. The rea-
come, even more so under the threat of entry. Petrakis and Vlassis (2000) finds
that right-to-manage bargaining is the equilibrium outcome if the unions’ bargain-
ing power is suﬃciently high, while Espinosa and Rhee (1989) find that eﬃcient
bargaining may emerge as an equilibrium outcome in infinitely repeated games.
22See also Davidson (1988).
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son is that merger between input suppliers is less likely in cross-border
mergers. If so, the downstream firms merge across borders to reduce the
rent extracted by the input suppliers.
Finally, we think our results could guide future empirical research
on the wage eﬀects of mergers. The results in the received empirical
literature are mixed. Some find support for a wage increase following
a merger, some for a wage cut, while others find no eﬀect at all.23 If
one in the same data material combines mergers with plant-specific and
firm-specific unions, one might find that mergers have - if any - only a
limited eﬀect on wages. According to our results the underlying truth
could be that some mergers result in wage drops while others give wage
rises. A proper empirical test should then start with a detailed study of
the union structure which, in turn, should lead to a discrimination in the
data material between industries with plant- and firm-specific unions.
Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Solving the no-merger game by backwards induction, we find that
input prices and profits in the symmetric Nash equilibrium are given by
wi =
θ (2− b)
2 + b− 2θb (A.1)
πi =
(2 + b)2 (1− θ)2
4 (1 + b)2 (2 + b− 2θb)2
(A.2)
In the case of plant-specific input suppliers, input prices and profits
in the asymmetric post-merger Nash equilibrium are given by
w1 = w2 =
2θ (2− b+ θb− 2b2 − θb2 + b3)
η (A.3)
w3 =
θ (4− b2 − 5θb2 + 2θb3)
η (A.4)
πm =
(1− θ)2 (2− b)2 (2 + b)2 (b+ 1) (2 + b+ θb− b2)2
2 (2 + 2b− b2)2 η2
(A.5)
π3 =
(1− θ)2 (1 + b)2 (4− b2 − 5θb2 + 2θb3)2
(2 + 2b− b2)2 η2
(A.6)
23Cremieux et al. (1996) and Peoples et al. (1993) find support for a wage cut
following a merger, while McGuckin et al. (1995) find the opposite result. Hekmat
(1995) find no evidence of any link between mergers and wages, while Gokhale et al.
(1993) find no or only limited evidence of a link between takeovers and wages.
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where
η = 4 + 4b− 4θb− b2 − 3θb2 − 2θ2b2 − b3 + θb3 + 2θ2b3 > 0
In the case of firm-specific input suppliers, input prices and profits
in the asymmetric post-merger Nash equilibrium are given by
wm =
θ (2 + b+ θb− b2)
2 + 2b− θ2b2
(A.7)
w3 =
θ (2 + 2θb− θb2)
2 + 2b− θ2b2
(A.8)
πm =
2 (1− θ)2 (1 + b) (2 + b+ θb− b2)2¡
2 + 2b− θ2b2
¢2
(2 + 2b− b2)2
(A.9)
π3 =
(1− θ)2 (1 + b)2 (2 + 2θb− θb2)2¡
2 + 2b− θ2b2
¢2
(2 + 2b− b2)2
(A.10)
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) From (A.1) and (A.4), w3 > wi if
θb2 (1− θ) (4− 4θ − 4θb+ 2θb2 − b2)
η (2 + b− 2θb) > 0.
The denominator is obviously positive for θ, b ∈ h0, 1i. The numer-
ator is positive if (4− 4θ − 4θb+ 2θb2 − b2) > 0. Rearranging yields
4 (1− θ (1 + b)) + b2 (2θ − 1) > 0. We see that this condition holds if
θ < 1
2
or if b is suﬃciently low.
(ii) From (A.1) and (A.3), wi > w1 = w2 reduces to
θb (1− θ) (4 + 4b− b2 − b3 − 2θb2 (1− b))
(2 + b− 2θb) η > 0.
which holds for θ, b ∈ h0, 1i.
(iii) From (A.3) and (A.4), w3 > w1 = w2 reduces to
θb (2b+ 1) (2− b) (1− θ)
η > 0
which is true for θ, b ∈ h0, 1i. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) A merger is profitable if πm−2πi > 0.
From Lemma 1 we know that this is true if θ = 0 and b < 0.55. From
Lemma 2 it must be the case that this is also true for b < 0.55 and θ > 0.
22
For b > 0.55 we know (from Lemma 1) that πm−2πi < 0 if θ = 0. Setting
b = 1, we can from (A.2) and (A.5) find that πm − 2πi > 0 if:
−9 + 138θ − 127θ2 + 8θ3(1 + θ)
72(2θ − 3)2 > 0.
This condition is met if θ > 0.07. Then we know that for θ ∈ h0, 1i
and b ∈ h0.55, 1i there are critical values where πm = 2πi. In Figure 3
(section 3) we have plotted the curve where πm = 2πi in a (θ, b)-diagram,
using the expressions in (A.2) and (A.5). It follows immediately that
πm > 2πi above the curve.
(ii) A participant earns πm/2 and the non-merging firm π3 in the
post-merger equilibrium. We know from Lemma 1 that for θ = 0, then
πm−2π3 < 0. Setting b = 1 and using the expressions reported in (A.2)
and (A.6), we have that πm − 2π3 < 0 if 20θ − 7θ2 > 4. This condition
is met if θ < 0.21. Then we know that for θ, b ∈ h0, 1i there are critical
values where πm − 2π3 = 0. In Figure 4 (section 3) we have plotted the
curve where πm = 2π3 in a (θ, b)-diagram, using the expressions in (A.2)
and (A.6). Obviously, πm > 2π3 above the curve . ¥
Proof of Lemma 3. From (A.1), (A.7) and (A.8), and after rear-
ranging, wm > w3 reduces to
θb (1− b) (1− θ)¡
2 + 2b− θ2b2
¢ > 0
whereas w3 > wi reduces to
θb2 (1− θ) (2 + 2θ − θb)¡
2 + 2b− θ2b2
¢
(2 + b− 2θb)
> 0
It can easily be seen that both inequalities hold for b, θ ∈ h0, 1i. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) We know from Lemma 1 that if θ = 0,
then πm > (<) 2πi if b < (>) 0.55. From Lemma 3 it must also be the
case that πm < 2πi if b > 0.55 and θ > 0. Then we know that there
are combinations of θ ∈ h0, 1i and b ∈ h0, 0.55i such that πm = 2πi. By
using the expressions in (A.2) and (A.9), we find these combinations of
θ and b. They are plotted in a (θ, b)-diagram in Figure 5 (section 4.1).
Obviously, above the curve shown in Figure 5 πm < 2πi.
(ii) We know from Lemma 1 that for exogenous input prices, πm <
2π3. Given the result in Lemma 3, it is trivial to see that the result in
Lemma 1 applies in this case too. ¥
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Proof of Proposition 3. When comparing Md and Mn, the de-
cisive group of owners consists of the merger participants in Md. The
comparison of equilibrium payoﬀs in this case coincides with the case of
firm-specific input suppliers in Section 4.1. Let πi (Mj) be the equilib-
rium profits of firm i in ownership structure Mj. From Proposition 2
we know that πm (Md) > 2πi (Mn), implying Md dom Mn, if b < 0.55
and θ is close to zero. For other parameter values, the dominance re-
lation is reversed. Likewise, when comparing Mc and Mn, the decisive
owners are the merger participants in Mc. This coincides with the case
of plant-specific input suppliers in Section 3, and from Proposition 1 we
know that πm (Mc) > 2πi (Mn), implying Mc dom Mn, unless b > 0.55
and θ is close to zero. For this (small) set of parameter values, the dom-
inance relation is reversed. Finally, when comparing Mc and Md, all
three owners are decisive. In this case we have to compare total indus-
try profits in the two diﬀerent market structures. This corresponds to a
comparison of post-merger industry profits for the case of plant-specific
and firm-specific input suppliers, respectively. Using (A.5), (A.6), (A.9)
and (A.10) in the appendix, we find that
P3
i=1 πi (Mc) >
P3
i=1 πi (Md),
implying Mc dom Md, for the entire set of parameter values. Hence, Mc
is undominated unless b > 0.55 and θ is close to zero, for which Mn is
undominated. ¥
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